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Abstract
In a climate of immigration securitization, recent years have 
seen a global move away from humanitarian resettlement 
responses in sites of displacement. Instead, wealthy govern-
ments in the Global North often finance poorer third coun-
tries and rural regions of territories to abet border enforce-
ment. The Jordan Compact, in particular, has been upheld 
as an economic development model that provides an “inno-
vative alternative” to refugee camps, as well as to protracted 
refugee situations. Yet, as much research shows, the direct 
economic gains from this trade concessions scheme have 
been limited. This raises the question, What value does the 
Jordan Compact hold with such ample evidence of failure? 
Importantly, how is this failure experienced by refugees in 
practice? Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Amman and 
northern Jordan, this article  advances a framework cen-
tred on extractivism to better detail how value is extracted 
from migrants and displaced persons at the expense of their 
well-being. The article illuminates the disjuncture between 
the lack of profit achieved directly from the Jordan Compact’s 
trade concessions and the forms of value extracted from 
refugees’ immobility. Overall, I argue that these economic 
development policies formalize precariousness, allowing the 
international community to abdicate global responsibility 
and reap the benefits of a purported altruism.
Résumé
Dans un climat de sécurisation de l’immigration, on a 
assisté ces dernières années à un recul des réponses de réins-
tallation humanitaires axées sur les sites de déplacement. 
Souvent, les gouvernements riches du Nord global financent 
plutôt des tiers pays plus pauvres ainsi que des régions et 
territoires ruraux pour soutenir des projets de renforcement 
des frontières. Le Pacte pour la Jordanie, en particulier, a 
été salué comme un modèle de développement économique 
qui fournit des « alternatives innovantesm» aux camps de 
réfugiés ainsi qu’aux situations de refuge prolongées. Cepen-
dant, comme le démontre beaucoup de recherches, les gains 
économiques immédiats de ce régime de concessions com-
merciales ont été limités. Ceci soulève la question suivante: 
quelle est la valeur accordée au Pacte pour la Jordanie 
malgré les preuves de son échec? Comment cet échec est-il 
vécu en pratique par les réfugiés ? S’appuyant sur du travail 
de terrain effectué à Amman et au nord de la Jordanie, cet 
article met de l’avant un cadre théorique centré sur l’extrac-
tivisme pour mieux saisir comment la valeur est extraite 
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des migrants et des personnes déplacées aux dépens de leur 
bien-être. L’article met en lumière l’écart entre le manque de 
bénéfices directement obtenus des concessions commerciales 
du Pacte pour la Jordanie et les formes de valeur extraites 
de l’immobilité des réfugiés. Globalement, je soutiens que 
ces politiques de développement économique formalisent 
les conditions de la précarité, permettant à la communauté 
internationale d’abdiquer sa responsabilité globale et de 
tirer profit d’un prétendu altruisme.
Since the Syrian conflict, over six million refugees have been displaced.1 As the crisis has continued into pro-tracted stages, wealthy governments in the Global 
North have moved away from humanitarian resettlement 
responses towards funding development projects in regions 
that neighbour the conflict. By financing less-developed 
countries, European governments in particular are looking 
to reduce transit migration from those countries and prevent 
the arrival of migrants across their borders through foreign 
investment and trade. Meanwhile, major refugee host states 
in the Global South have leveraged their proximity to sites of 
mass displacement in order to negotiate self-serving policies.2
Jordan holds the third-largest population of registered 
Syrian refugees in the region at 671,428 people, but second 
in demographic ratio of Syrians in the country.3 Within the 
wider refugee-development policy trend, the government 
of Jordan, the European Union (EU), and the World Bank 
signed the US$1.7 billion Jordan Compact in February 2016, 
a landmark political declaration. The compact was designed 
to transform the challenges of hosting such a significant 
number of Syrian refugees into a development opportunity 
for Jordan, while also improving the livelihoods of both 
Jordanians and the country’s Syrian refugee population. The 
deal combines humanitarian and development funding with 
pledges of US$700 million in grants to Jordan annually for 
three years and concessional loans of $1.9 billion. Payment of 
grants and loans are linked to specific targets. One of these 
targets is to expand access to the formal labour market for 
Syrian refugees by issuing 200,000 work permits in specified 
sectors and support Syrian education through the Accelerat-
ing Access to Quality Formal Education plan. The compact 
also stipulates that Jordan will institute reforms to improve 
the business and investment environment and formalize Syr-
ian businesses. In exchange, Jordan would be offered con-
siderable financial support and the opening up of tariff-free 
trade in the European market to Jordanian goods. Unem-
ployment in Jordan stands at 18.2 per cent (around double 
that for youth) and 14.4 per cent in poverty.4 Tying eco-
nomic incentives directly to work opportunities for refugees 
attempts to open the job market to Syrians and Jordanians. It 
is also a means for the Jordanian government to create new 
economic opportunities by encouraging more international 
aid to be channelled into the country.
This article considers employment programs focused on 
Syrian refugees in Jordan, on the basis of my empirical find-
ings in the field. Although refugee employment is signifi-
cantly promoted by organizations like the World Bank and 
the EU, behind the headlines, the Jordan Compact has been 
widely considered a failure.5 In non-governmental and state 
reporting, and in migration studies scholarship, a critical 
body of literature has been produced on the Jordan Compact 
in recent years.6 In these studies, the work permit process 
is found to be complex and time-consuming, with many 
employers continuing to employ refugees without permits.7 
My findings expand upon this research into the impact of 
economic policies on migrants’ and refugees’ subjectivi-
ties8 and Syrian refugee policies focused on employment in 
particular.9 This scholarship offers a critical picture of the 
merging of humanitarian and economic agendas, looking at 
the effects of a major policy trend that intersects neoliberal 
values and refugee policies. 
Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner’s research is arguably 
the pre-eminent academic study of the Jordan Compact.10 
They show that meaningful social changes have been aban-
doned for refugees in Jordan in the quest for meeting formal 
targets of donors and implementing agencies. Their work 
details how international refugee responses have moved 
from portraying Syrian refugees as objects of humanitar-
ian care to development opportunities. Yet underneath the 
mantra of self-reliance, jobs available for refugees tend to be 
in sectors like garment manufacture, which are unregulated 
and rife with overtime physical abuse.11 The labour rights of 
migrants can be compromised, resulting in extremely low 
wages, forced overtime, and forms of exploitation. 
Much of this research draws attention to the encroach-
ment of economic agendas into humanitarian contexts. In 
recent years, market metrics have been brought to the fore by 
humanitarian workers striving to maintain relevance.12 In fact, 
“transforming the refugee crisis into a development oppor-
tunity” is the operational mantra surrounding the Jordan 
Compact, with Jordan showcased as the poster child of this 
“win-win” solution.13 Yet, as others show, the direct economic 
gains from the trade concessions scheme have been very 
limited, and from this standpoint, it should be considered as 
a disaster.14 This questions the value of the Jordan Compact 
with such an ample evidence of failure. And importantly, how 
is this failure experienced by refugees in practice?
Building on the work of Kelberer15 and Lenner and 
Turner,16 I argue that refugee employment efforts are bet-
ter understood through a framework centred on extractiv-
ism: an analytic I have advanced elsewhere to document 
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and critically theorize the expansion of mining sectors into 
domains of human resources, such as migrants and refu-
gees.17 Extractivism is a mode of accumulation, with deep 
roots in colonial and imperial endeavours, whereby natural 
resources are removed at a high intensity for export markets.18 
As a method of colonial appropriation, extractivism has been 
essential in the industrial development and prosperity of the 
Global North at the expense of poorer countries, particularly 
in the Global South.19 The exploitation of raw minerals has 
also enabled wealthy networks of transnational elites, and 
the domination of corporations and non-governmental 
organizations to move into ever-growing resource frontiers 
globally.20 Here, capitalist values have encroached into 
new forms of extractive intrusion that amount to extract-
ing value(s) from humans, whereby countries in the Global 
South strategically capitalize on the value of refugee hosting 
and/or containment.
Arguably, one of the major reasons why scholarship 
has difficulty in capturing the political economic logics of 
refugee employment programs in Jordan is that it is often 
reduced to economic interests alone. Capital, of course, takes 
a variety of forms, including human, financial, symbolic, 
and moral capital, all of which generate surplus value, and 
all of which enter into the refugee equation. Migrants and 
displaced persons have become utilized as forms of capital 
through containment,21 here, under the line of “refugee 
crisis as development opportunity.” The extractivism frame-
work makes clear how value is extracted from refugees, as 
one lucrative industry sector. Although only 7 per cent of 
the world’s population are refugees, governments around 
the world, particularly in the Global North, have also gained 
purchase through the symbolic capital attached to refugees 
and migrants.22 This includes the representation of a spec-
tacle of strict asylum policies, as much as one of humani-
tarian benevolence. In a climate of immigration control and 
securitization, poorer third countries such as Jordan, and 
rural regions of territories, have been financed to abet the 
project of border outsourcing and externalization.23 Such 
forms of support entail not only direct cash payments, but 
also economic contributions to fund national security or 
development interests in exchange for refugee-hosting 
efforts. Incentives also include the renegotiation of trade 
agreements, which open Western markets to states in the 
Global South, and the relaxing of travel restrictions, as has 
been the case with Morocco and Turkey.24 Meanwhile, cor-
porations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, 
and academics, among others, also profit as contracts are 
outsourced for refugee-hosting provisions or opportunities 
arise for conducting research projects.25 These developments 
have led scholars to refer to an “immigration industrial 
complex”26 and an expansive “migration business.”27 
Proponents of rentier state theories, on the other hand, 
argue that economic liberalization discourse is mainly 
window-dressing, and underneath lie political rationalities 
of appeasing different constituencies.28 Victoria Kelberer has 
coined the term refugee rentierism to detail how states lever-
age their position as host states of displaced communities.29 
Using refugee rights as a strategic instrument of foreign 
policy, Jordan, as one major host state engaging in refugee 
rent-seeking behaviour, extracts revenue from other states 
for maintaining those refugee groups within their borders. 
This article takes these logics into account, illuminating the 
disjuncture between the lack of profit achieved directly from 
the Jordan Compact’s trade concessions and the political 
economic logics of Jordan’s rent-seeking strategies. Instead 
oft focusing on the profoundly political problems that 
underpin the drivers of forced migration, I argue that the 
Jordan Compact regulates people’s movement while extract-
ing value-laden prerogatives.
These debates are important to consider. International 
advisors have presented the socioeconomic integration of 
Syrians in Jordan as a way to support Syrians financially 
and boost the Jordanian economy overall, while reducing 
the number of Syrians attempting to reach Europe. Similar 
models in other host states such as Ethiopia, Lebanon, and 
Turkey also tie refugees in with financial incentives and the 
underlying goal of stemming the flow of migrants and refu-
gees to Europe. The high commissioner for refugees, Filippo 
Grandi, recently announced that the Jordan Compact offers 
a “new blueprint for supporting refugees.”30 However, as 
this article will show, the economic development model of 
the Jordan Compact has not only failed to reinvigorate the 
Jordanian economy, but it has also not offered Syrians the 
prospect of a dignified, self-sufficient life. Given that the 
Jordan Compact was widely endorsed by development and 
humanitarian actors, it is essential to question some of the 
assumptions and beliefs that underpin its practice.
This article draws on fieldwork in Jordan and New York 
during 2018, a period that saw protests in Jordan and the 
ousting of Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki. Prior to the 
protests, I led a week-long field intensive with university 
students from the New School in March 2018 to examine 
the implementation of the Jordan Compact. Students inter-
viewed leading humanitarian and development organiza-
tions operating in Amman whose work intersects with 
refugee employment. These interviews were planned and led 
by students who devised interview questions connected to 
the project’s overall objectives. During the field visit, other 
opportunities also arose for learning about the context in 
more depth, including simply speaking with refugees, locals, 
and aid workers in more informal settings. I returned to Jor-
dan in June 2018 and then February–March 2019 to conduct 
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follow-up research as well as facilitating fieldwork trips for 
the New School students at the International Rescue Com-
mittee’s office in Amman. 
This article starts by presenting the particularities of 
the Jordanian context, placing the country’s newest “trade 
deal” within past national economic development projects 
and experiences of hosting refugees. I then turn to examine 
the characteristics of and challenges faced by employment 
programs in Jordan, detailing how extractive logics have 
overtaken refugees’ well-being. I close by placing the Jordan 
Compact within a system of globalized production, in which 
forms of value circulate outside of Jordan at the expense of 
refugees’ immobility. Overall, I find that these policies for-
malize precariousness, allowing the international commu-
nity to abdicate global responsibility and reap the benefits of 
a purported altruism. 
Oil Turned Refugee Economies
The Jordan Compact is best understood locally within the 
Hashemite Kingdom’s extractive history and economic 
dependencies. Jordan has long depended on the support 
of outside powers such as Great Britain, the United States, 
and oil-rich Arab states for its economic and political well-
being.31 Even after independence in 1946, from its establish-
ment as a British protectorate, Jordan’s finances remained 
guided by the British government. But in the 1950s and 
1970s, Jordan shot up economically as a result of remittances 
received from migration to neighbouring oil-rich countries. 
Jordanian workers flocked to Gulf states to work the oil fields 
as skilled laborers and in professional positions such as engi-
neers, bankers, and teachers.32 The kingdom relied increas-
ingly on these Gulf connections as a source of Jordanian 
employment, labour remittances, and considerable Arab 
foreign aid to Jordan. Jordan was viewed as a frontline state 
in the conflict with Israel, with some 500,000 Palestinians 
taking refuge in the country following the Arab-Israeli war 
of 1948, and then subsequent annexation of the West Bank in 
1949, which almost trebled the population.33 
In turn, the discovery of phosphate in Jordan in 1908 and 
later establishment of mining from 1935 through the Trans-
Jordan Phosphate Company grew a successful resource 
extractive industry for the country.34 The Arab Potash Com-
pany was later developed in 1956 to harvest minerals in the 
Dead Sea, with potassium phosphate and potassic fertilizers 
remaining the top exports of Jordan to this day.35 As many 
Jordanians left to work in the Gulf, increasing numbers of 
migrant workers moved to Jordan, predominantly from 
Egypt and Southeast Asia, to fill demand for low-wage work-
ers in domestic work, agriculture, construction, and service 
industries. Thus, low-skilled immigration simultaneously 
heightened Jordanians’ status via a job-ladder effect, and 
foreign labour became part of the clientelist redistribution of 
assets to citizens.36 But by the 1980s Jordan’s economy began 
to struggle with low productivity and high unemployment 
rates. The Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980–8), and later Gulf War (1990–1) upset regional oil pro-
duction rates, resulting in declining labour remittances and 
Arab bilateral aid to Jordan. This coincided with the estab-
lishment of higher government spending by the kingdom’s 
economic planners. Increasing shortfalls in the national 
budget spurred Jordan onto a greater level of borrowing. 
With the decline in remittances and aid, Jordan’s national 
debt steadily rose, until by 1988 the country’s debt was twice 
its gross domestic product (GDP). 
From this point, Jordan’s relationship with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) played a key part in guiding 
the country’s trajectories, with an economic liberalization 
program in place since 1989.37 Then Prime Minister Zayd 
al-Rifaai turned to the IMF and World Bank for assistance 
with Jordan’s debt payments in a five-year plan for economic 
adjustment and stabilization, including dramatically cutting 
government expenditures. However, in Jordan the imposi-
tion of neoliberal economic policies since the 1980s has been 
accompanied by political instability and unrest. Economic 
adjustment programs removed a key source of welfare for the 
public, while simultaneously reducing government spend-
ing in major sectors.38 When the government attempted to 
comply with IMF guidelines, austerity plans produced vio-
lent results, with riots spreading across the country in April 
1989, August 1996, and June 2018. At times, the Hashemite 
regime backed down to comply with protestors, at others, 
they proceeded apace with few concessions. 
Within this context of former colonial power relations 
and economic instability, refugees have played a major part 
in Jordan’s development as forms of human, financial, and 
symbolic capital. The country has a history as a refugee 
host state far before it was formalized a state independent 
from British control in 1946.39 Since that time, Jordan has 
hosted displaced people from Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and 
Palestine, as some of the more significant waves of refugees. 
According to the UNHCR, Jordan ranked as the second-high-
est host to the largest number of refugees relative to national 
population in 2017, where one in fourteen people was a 
refugee under the UNHCR’s responsibility.40 When including 
Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate, the figures rise 
to one in three for Jordan. 
The Jordanian government has been astute about its nego-
tiation of international aid through refugee policy. While 
Syrian refugees currently account for the largest group of 
refugees registered with the UNHCR, Jordan also hosts over 
two million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA. The 
arrival of Palestinian refugees from 1948, followed by those 
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who fled the Six-Day War in 1967, brought major challenges 
for the country.41 Many of the official camps established for 
Palestinian refugees became enclaves for Palestinian militia 
and remain severely economically deprived. Yet Palestinian 
refugees contributed to the country’s economic development 
in significant ways. First, they allowed Jordan to receive large 
amounts of development assistance from the international 
community to help resettle and integrate the refugees. Sec-
ond, the remittances of those Palestinians who went to look 
for work in Persian Gulf states also helped develop Jordan’s 
public and private sectors. These remittances, together with 
foreign aid, have contributed to developing sectors of the 
Jordanian economy by providing start-up money for Jorda-
nian businesses and for large state-sponsored projects.
With the Iraqi crisis, Jordan strategically increased its 
use of refugee hosting as an instrument of foreign policy. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, Jordan’s sources of foreign aid 
decreased and its appeals for humanitarian aid centred on 
the “burden” of hosting thousands of Iraqi refugees. The 
Jordanian government was later criticized for inflating the 
size of the crisis and the level of need to elicit higher funding 
rates. For example, the government cited numbers as high 
as 750,000–1,000,000, while other groups concluded that no 
more than 100,000–200,000 Iraqis were in the country as 
refugees.42 Thus, by expanding or retracting refugee rights, 
Jordan was able to frame its ongoing ability to adequately 
protect and assist Iraqi refugees as dependent on contribu-
tions from the international community.
New opportunities have now emerged for Jordan as a coun-
try proximate to the Syrian conflict.43 The Jordan Compact 
came about partially through the work of a Jordanian think 
tank, the West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA), which 
submitted a White Paper to the Jordanian government on 
the potential contribution of Syrian refugees to the Jordanian 
economy. This was met by the work of Oxford economics and 
forced migration professors Paul Collier and Alexander Betts, 
who widely endorsed pathways for Syrians into the Jordanian 
labour market.44 At the time, the Jordanian government was 
already arguing that hosting Syrian refugees has harmed the 
country’s development outcomes. In fact, the World Bank 
estimated in 2016 that the Jordan government had spent over 
$2.5 billion a year in direct costs for hosting Syrian refugees 
since the onset of the crisis: 6 per cent of GDP and 25 per 
cent of the government’s annual revenues.45 An increasingly 
right-wing political climate was also sweeping across Europe, 
with the EU seeking ways to manage, and halt, the numbers 
of refugees arriving at European borders. For European states, 
the Jordan Compact was a way to deter Syrian refugees from 
migrating to Europe by improving their livelihoods in Jordan. 
Meanwhile, Jordan was already heavily in debt. For the Jor-
danian government, the compact presented an opportunity 
for favourable trade arrangements with the EU (predicted to 
result in increased investment), in addition to an aid package 
and concessional loans. 
This is what Victoria Kelberer describes as “refugee 
rentierism” or “the phenomenon of using host status and 
refugee policy as primary mechanisms of international 
rent-seeking.”46 Through the bargaining power of refugees, 
Jordan was able to extract increased contributions from 
the international community, in much the same way as the 
€6bn ($6.8 billion) EU-Turkey deal, in which Turkey agreed 
to contain refugees within its borders: allegedly as many as 
three million refugees.47 However, whereas Turkey agreed to 
receive deported migrants in exchange for money and visa-
free travel to the Schengen zone, the Jordanian government 
pledged to promote Syrian economic and social integration. 
Thus, in different ways, the Syrian “refugee boom” yielded 
new opportunities for Jordan to have access to labour mar-
kets and sources of foreign aid. 
The next section turns to examine the grounded effects 
of the compact in more detail, arguing that extractive logics 
have overtaken the social concerns of refugees’ and migrants’ 
well-being. The contemporary Jordanian strategy for acquir-
ing international aid by hosting Syrian refugees comes at the 
very expense of the refugees that the project is nominally 
supposed to support.
Jordan Compact in Practice
We have gone to the garment factories [in Khaldiyeh] linking 
Jordanians and Syrians with employers. Both Jordanian and Syr-
ian women have successfully started working but then they have 
dropped out. Why? Because it takes at least thirty minutes to get 
there, one hour both ways. They need to work ten hours, minimum 
eight hours with two hours extra.… Mothers only want to work 
eight hours, but this doesn’t work for the industry. 
—NGO representative, Amman48
We meet with Nadine in her handicraft store several floors 
up in a tall, nondescript office building, above a bank in a 
busy street in central Amman. In contrast to the grey exterior, 
inside the walls are brightly coloured, shelves heaved with 
handmade soaps, vials of rosewater, knitted children’s toys, 
shawls, and crocheted table decorations, delicately wrapped 
in exquisite packaging. Several women wearing headscarves 
milled around from the end of a shift, all once from far-flung 
cities and villages across Syria. Nadine is one of the lucky 
ones as the co-owner of her own business, but not without 
struggles and perseverance. For Syrians, owning your own 
business is not an easy prospect. “Work permits, work per-
mits” is a phrase we hear incessantly as Syrians frequently tell 
us about the complex bureaucratic process of acquiring one. 
For small business-owners like Nadine, obtaining a work 
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permit is often Kafka-esque, and unsuccessful. There are two 
routes: either pay 50,000 Jordanian dinars (US$70,462) and 
partner with a local, or pay 200,000JOD (US$281,850) to be 
classified as an investor.49 
Nadine’s story appears to be relatively characteristic of 
others we have heard. She initially partnered with a local 
businessman to set up her handicraft store in Amman, but 
he took advantage of her precarious status as a foreign citi-
zen and made off with the majority of her investment and 
stock—something she found was of little interest to local 
police, who chalked off the incident as little more than unfor-
tunate. Luckily, before the Syrian conflict, Nadine had a suc-
cessful business in Damascus. Savings, family connections in 
Europe, NGO grants, and the partnership of a Syrian cousin 
enabled her to reignite the small business. Now committed 
to helping those affected by the war, Nadine has over one 
hundred Syrian women on flexible contracts (some working 
from home) to help produce the beautifully packaged goods 
so intricately placed around her store: a far cry from when 
she first started in 2013 with five women in a dingy office 
space. Some of the women are widows, others successful 
young professionals unable to instrumentalize their skills in 
Jordan, a number have husbands still fighting in the war or 
curtailed from working by Jordan’s strict immigration rules. 
“We work on our own terms here,” she tells us, describing 
how the cooperative works to combat the demands of most 
available employment for Syrian refugees—concerns voiced 
by the NGO representative in the opening quote to this sec-
tion. Instead, Nadine now sells products online and on social 
media, and even advertises through AirBnB Experiences to 
help guarantee a steady stream of revenue, bulking up her 
retail with soap-making workshops for tourists, wealthy 
Ammanites, and NGO workers. 
Nadine’s experience speaks to just some of the myriad dif-
ficulties encountered by Syrian refugees in Jordan. Although 
wrapped in discourses of innovation, the Jordan Compact 
has been marred by failures and uneven outcomes. The com-
pact had two major elements—the development of special 
economic zones or SEZs (industrial parks for manufacturing 
goods) and the issuing of work permits to Syrian refugees 
in specified sectors both in and out of the industrial export 
zones.50 Besides development funding, Jordan was promised 
access to tariff-free trade with the EU, providing it issued at 
least 200,000 work permits to Syrians. While work permits 
were made widely available to Syrians from April 2016, by Feb-
ruary 2017 only 38,516 permits had been issued, the majority 
in agriculture and construction.51 The government sought to 
meet its quotas by formalizing work in agriculture, construc-
tion, and manufacturing. But, according to local NGOs, many 
of the work permits in the agricultural sector were based on 
Syrian workers in the country prior to the conflict. 
In reality, the compact has created few if any new jobs, 
and instead redistributes some positions held by migrant 
Bangladeshis and Egyptians to Syrian refugees as preferential 
migrant workers, which helps meet formal targets of donors 
and implementing agencies. Meanwhile, although Syrian refu-
gees are allowed to apply for work permits outside of the SEZs, 
they are barred from applying for some professions, such as 
engineering, medicine, law, teaching, driving, and hairdress-
ing, for which they have previously been trained, but which 
are viewed as potentially taking opportunities from Jordanian 
workers. Instead, jobs are in backbreaking sectors like gar-
ment manufacture, agriculture, and construction that are of 
little interest to the majority of the population, many just hav-
ing been through the brutality of conflict and displacement. 
These jobs are unregulated and are at times rife with overtime 
physical abuse. The hours are punishingly long (a minimum 
of ten-hour shifts), wages low, and safety of little concern.  
Several NGOs in Jordan have taken an interest in employer-
matching programs to ensure more accountability of other-
wise occluded business practices. However, these NGOs also 
hold their own work quotas—one organization I spoke with 
cited a “20,0000 refugees in employment scheme”—in addi-
tion to being understaffed and under-resourced.52 The drive 
to reach these sorts of employment targets by contracted 
NGOs calls into question their ability to act as employer 
watchdog enforcers. While the Jordanian government has 
made some changes to ease the work permit process for Syr-
ian refugees, including waiving the work permit fee and pri-
oritizing Syrian refugees over other foreign workers, Syrians 
continue to face extreme restrictions to employment. Not 
only do Syrians in Jordan face significant barriers in access-
ing decent, paid work, but a future Syria is as risk of what was 
so often described to me by refugees and advocates as “a lost 
generation,” unused to core professions such as medicine, 
engineering, and education.53 
For many Syrians, there is little advantage to formalized 
employment. Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic labour 
market has resulted in widespread informal work. For some 
refugees I spoke with there is fear of losing access to the 
UNHCR cash assistance or the chance of resettlement to a 
third country. “If we do lose our job we could end up without 
any income at all,” Mohammad, a father of three pointed out, 
voicing the widespread concern that holding a work permit 
may make one ineligible for cash assistance, and thus unable 
to cover what a family needs to survive.54 As a result, refugees 
must choose between working informally at the risk of arrest 
and deportation or seeking unskilled work on a one-year 
working permit. Other refugees suggested that work permits 
might actually decrease their working conditions because 
their work permit sponsor exerts extreme controls over their 
mobility.55 Being reliant on precarious worker visas places 
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workers in a position where they end up not voicing con-
cerns, perhaps more exploitable and paid lesser wages—or 
are unaware of the labour standards that should be in place. 
Some refugees prefer to remain under the radar rather 
than risk registering with a government they mistrust. 
“Sometimes authorities will make it hard for you even if you 
have papers,” Mohammad continued. “They’ll make trouble 
for you just because they feel like it. Nothing—paper or no 
paper—is really protection.” Deportations of Syrians have 
indeed skyrocketed since 2016, with reports of more than 
4,100 Syrians returned to Syria on the grounds that they pose 
potential security problems, including working without a 
permit, which is the most prominent reason for deportation 
in a context where workplace raids have become common-
place.56 It is not uncommon for Syrian refugees to register for 
work permits as protection from deportation. However, this 
is clearly counter to the aims of the compact, which was pre-
sented as beneficial for Syrians. Given that refugees in camps 
have minimal freedom of movement outside, the “opportu-
nity” to work in factories when they have little other option 
is certainly coercive, and counter to the “helping refugees 
help themselves” motto that Betts and Collier advanced.57 
Particular challenges are felt by women in the Jordan 
Compact experiment, some of which were voiced by Nadine 
and members of her team, as they sought to ameliorate 
the corporate and back-breaking work structure of labour 
production.58 Less than 4 per cent of formal work permits 
have been issued to women, while at the time of my field-
work only 150 Syrian women were part of a cash-for-work 
program from Zaatari to the industrial parks. I found that 
the principle factor for these low take-up rates related 
to the location and requirements of the industry. Syrian 
women face gender roles and responsibilities as mothers 
or at times in female-headed households, which are on the 
rise from 25 per cent a few years ago to nearly 40 per cent 
in 2016.59 With employment at minimum wage (220JOD or 
US$310 a month) and working conditions of little concern, 
it is unsurprising that efforts in targeting Syrian women to 
work have encountered difficulties. In another interview, a 
UNHCR representative said that even when they launched 
the “perfect” program, which provided Syrian women with 
child care, transportation to factories, and decent working 
hours and conditions, they still failed to retain workers.60 
Rather, Syrian women generally prefer to work at home, or 
close to home for cultural and practical reasons. Many Syr-
ian women run their own income-generating projects from 
home, including knitting, beauty salons, or clothes altering. 
Yet, instead of supporting home-based businesses, 
limitations are placed on creating home-businesses that 
have affected Syrian women’s economic autonomy. These 
restrictions have led to a culture of occlusion where home 
businesses are hidden under the radar, in fear of deporta-
tion. For example, one Syrian woman I spoke with described 
running a hairdressing salon (a closed-off sector) out of her 
home, quickly swapping bottles of shampoo for nail polish 
(an open sector), during a spate of police visitations.61 This 
case characterizes the perennial fear and at times farcical 
practices that Syrian refugees are forced to engage in con-
stantly. In a country where female labour force participation 
is very low, 14 per cent in 2016 (compared to 22 per cent in 
the MENA region), and where the unemployment rate for 
young women (aged fifteen to twenty-four) is at 56 per cent, 
nearly double the rate of that of young men (29 per cent), 
the Jordan Compact only strengthens the gender gap across 
locals and refugees alike.62
What is clear from these findings is how the concerns of 
affected populations have been subsumed under the guise 
of “development.” As James C. Scott famously showed, large-
scale authoritarian plans misfire when they fail to integrate 
local, practical knowledge.63 In quickstep with this classic 
critique of development and humanitarian work, the majority 
of refugees in Jordan were not actively consulted in the com-
pact programs that affect their lives, nor were experts on the 
region, NGOs, and research centres in Jordan. Rather, the com-
pact reveals a high level of donor interest in presenting Jordan 
as a model of reform and globalization in the MENA region 
in order to allow for the continued management of refugees 
outside of Europe.64 At its core the compact aims to reduce 
the international migration of Syrians, but it should be rec-
ognized that migration is an essential part of people’s future 
well-being that is actually an agent of development.65 Mean-
while, an overwhelming aid industry has grown in Jordan 
around Syrian refugees as major funding targets of develop-
ment aid. For many service providers, there is little incentive 
in directly critiquing the compact when it runs in opposition 
to the extraction of revenue.66 The compact itself provides 
little incentive for Jordan to implement the much-needed 
reforms for overhauling the business development landscape. 
Instead, the Jordanian government relies largely on the quick 
cash from the arrangement to kickstart their economy, often 
at the expense of the people the project is supposed to help.
In recent years, we see a move towards instrumentaliz-
ing North/South power relations in order to facilitate new 
modes of extraction in migration management and contain-
ment. These relationships often have imperial dimensions, 
reproducing lasting colonial patterns of trade and depend-
ency.67 Harnessing humans as resources in this way, this 
article has argued, is really a program of extraction for the 
benefit of governments and investors. Rather than creating 
livelihood opportunities for refugees, the Jordan Compact 
demonstrates a high degree of control and coercion over 
individuals. This is justified by some, such as the Jordanian 
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government, by receiving financial support and interna-
tional kudos for the future; by European governments, for 
the value of militating against the movement of refugees 
to Europe; and by others, including contracted NGOs, the 
economic and/or moral value of contracts associated with 
refugee integration provisions. Ultimately, instead of focus-
ing on the profoundly political problems that underpin 
the drivers of forced migration, such as increased conflict, 
the compact runs the risk of abdicating global responsibil-
ity, regulating people’s movement in line with value-laden 
interests.  
Conclusion
This article has questioned whether employment programs in 
Jordan offer meaningful work for Syrian refugees or whether 
they are arrangements for extracting value. What was stark 
throughout my fieldwork was the many disadvantages for 
the compact’s perceived beneficiaries. Although presented 
by the international community through buzzwords like 
innovation and self-reliance, and helping refugees help them-
selves, my findings indicated that Syrian refugees (and non-
Syrian refugee and migrant worker populations) in Jordan 
all too often end up in hazardous or precarious informal 
work in the quest for government and organizational gain. 
Indeed, the ramping up of assistance operations has created 
thousands of jobs within the humanitarian response sec-
tor as well as numerous indirect jobs across other sectors.68 
Yet while refugees are immobilized in Jordan, deprived of 
movement to wealthier countries with established resettle-
ment systems, their immobility makes possible the mobility 
of value outside of Jordan’s borders. Now, the spectacle of 
border-making generates a multitude of images and dis-
cursive formations that fuel anti-immigrant sentiments for 
European political and organizational profit.69 In the pro-
cess, a range of actors can extract political, economic, and 
moral value while refugees’ bodies stay in Jordan. 
At the same time, the global visibility of arrangements like 
the Jordan Compact induces new policies to be taken up and 
embedded in different contexts. Migration studies scholars 
have identified a trend in asylum outsourcing and develop-
ment projects as a means for states to shrink spaces of asy-
lum and subvert international refugee law.70 Nation states 
use financially struggling states to warehouse migrants and 
isolate them from asylum claims processes. Jordan is part 
of a fashion of geopolitical cooperation between wealthier 
former colonial states and poorer dependent ones around 
frontiering projects. In an age of refugee demonization, 
the Jordan Compact model is now being trialled for other 
countries as a “solution” for European countries keen to 
deter migrant and asylum seeker arrivals. Financing refugee 
hosting capacities in countries viewed as ones of transit for 
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